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Abstract—Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well
understood. Computing the value of such a game is
straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent
on a random state of the game known to one, both, or
neither of the players, the resulting value of the game has
been analyzed under the framework of Bayesian games.
This investigation considers the optimal performance in a
game when a helper is transmitting state information to
one of the players.
Encoding information for an adversarial setting (game)
requires a different result than rate-distortion theory
provides. Game theory has accentuated the importance
of randomization (mixed strategy), which does not find a
significant role in most communication modems and source
coding codecs. Higher rates of communication, used in
the right way, allow the message to include the necessary
random component useful in games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-player zero-sum games play a fundamental role
in game theory because their analysis is straightforward.
The min-max theorem of von Neumann [1] establishes a
unique value of the game. Figure 1 shows the payoff
matrix for a basic game. Since neither of the pure
strategies for Player A dominates the other, a mixed
strategy is optimal. Player A will choose action 0 with
probability 1/4 and action 1 with probability 3/4. By
doing this, the expected payoff for Player A is 3/4 no
matter which strategy Player B chooses.
In a Bayesian game, the payoff matrix, which we
represent by Π(a, b) over the domain of pure strategies
a and b, is a random quantity. We can model this as a
game with a random state S that determines the payoffs,
referred to in the literature as the “type.” The value
of such a game depends on the information known to
the players. If the neither player knows S (aside from
its distribution), then the value of the game can be
derived from the expected value of the payoff matrix.
Additionally, if both players know S then the value can
be derived from the payoff matrix associated with every
instance of S and averaged. More interesting cases occur
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Fig. 1. Example of two-player zero-sum game. The entries in the
matrix represent the payoff that Player A receives, which is negative
of the payoff for Player B. To maximize the minimum expected
payoff, Player A chooses action 0 with probability 1/4 and action
1 with probability 3/4. This results in an expected payoff of 3/4 for
Player A.
when only one player knows S or when both players
have incomplete information about S.
Consider a situation where different functions of the
state S are known to both of the players of the game.
These functions can be represented by a partition over
the support of S known as the information structure, as
illustrated in Figure 2. It has been established that games
of this form can be solved by expanding the space of
pure strategies to include strategies that depend on the
available information. The min-max theorem still holds.
Samples of inquiries into the value of information can
be found in the following publications: [2], [3], [4], [5].
While information can only increase a players optimal
score in a game, not all information structures are equal,
even if they contain the same quantity of information.
For a given resolution, what is the optimal information
structure?
In this work we consider a repeated game setting
where the state of the game S is i.i.d. and known non-
causally to a helper who is assisting one of the players
of the game. The helper can communicate with a rate
limit of R bits per iteration of the game. The opposing
player may or may not know S but is certainly aware
PSfrag replacements
Distribution of state S
Quantization into bins
Fig. 2. Example of information structure. This model for discussing
partial state (“type”) information in a Bayesian game uses a partition
over the domain of the state to represent the “information structure.”
A player of the game observes only a discrete function of the state
indicating the cell that the state belongs to. Each player of the game
may have a different information structure.
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Fig. 3. Erasure game. This game has two states that are equally
likely. Player A must play A = S or A = e with probability 1.
Therefore, if Player A does not know the state, A = e is the only
choice.
of the conspiracy against him. Even the protocol for
communication is known (or learned) by the opposing
player. We establish information theoretic lower-bounds
to the optimal performance. We show through examples
that the intuition provided by rate-distortion theory can
be misleading in this setting.
II. EXAMPLE - ERASURE GAME
We illustrate in Figure 3 a two-player game with a
binary, equally distributed state. Player A has three pure
strategies, 0, e, and 1. Player B only has two strategies,
0, and 1. The matrix values represent the payoff Player A
receives for any given state S and pair of actions A and
B (pure strategies). As this is a zero-sum game, Player B
receives negative of the payoff of Player A. We concern
ourselves with average payoff, averaged with respect to
probabilities if mixed strategies are involved.
Notice that Player A will at all costs avoid choosing a
pure strategy of A = 1 when the state is S = 0, or vice
versa, hence the label “erasure game.”1 So if Player A is
1The results in this paper actually require the payoffs to be finite.
Here we use −∞ casually. The same consequences would result from
a finite but greatly negative payoff in place of −∞.
TABLE I
VALUE OF ERASURE GAME UNDER VARYING INFORMATION
STRUCTURES
Value
Neither knows S 1/2
Both know S 3/4
A knows S 3/2
B knows S 0
ignorant of the state S, he has no option but to choose e
with probability one. We can therefore deduce the value
of the game for two of the four information structures in
Table I. If Player B does not know the state of the game,
then on average A will get a payoff of 1/2. If Player B
does know the state S then he will choose the strategy
B = S, resulting in a payoff of zero.
On the other hand, if Player A knows the state S
while Player B does not, then equilibrium will occur with
Player A choosing A = S and scoring 3/2 on average.
Finally, we can consider the case where they both know
the state. As we observed in the game of Figure 1, Player
A will choose the mixed strategy consisting of A = S
with probability 1/4 and A = e with probability 3/4.
Player B will choose B = S with probability 1/4 and
B = 1 − S with probability 3/4. The resulting average
payoff is 3/4.
In the “erasure game” the state is binary, so these four
information structures mentioned exhaust all determin-
istic information structures. No intriguing optimization
problem presents itself in only one iteration of the game.
For example, we can’t ask, “what is the best information
structure for Player A that has cardinality two?” There
is only one choice of information structure. Fortunately,
a more graceful spectrum of information structures is
available with vector quantization.
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF DETERMINISTIC ENCODING
Consider a repeated-game setting of the erasure game
where a helper observes the state of the game and com-
municates to Player A over a rate-limited channel. Both
players know all past actions and states. Additionally,
the helper, and possibly Player B, observe the state
completely and non-causally. The helper and Player A
select a block length n and arrange a protocol by which
the helper will send nR bits describing the state to Player
A. Player A will then play the game for n iterations.
Player B has full knowledge of the protocol but does
not actually see the message. We ask for the maximum
average payoff that can be achieved for a give rate R.
In other words, what is the max-min value of this game
as a function of R?
We begin with a simple case. As Table I shows,
if Player A and Player B both know the state S, the
value of the game is 3/4. But what if Player A only
learns of the state through communication from a helper,
while Player B observes the state directly? What rate of
communication is needed for Player A to still achieve an
average payoff of 3/4? Recall that the uniquely optimal
strategy for Player A is to choose A = S with probability
1/4 and A = e with probability 3/4.
We can use rate-distortion theory as inspiration for an-
swering this question. Rate-distortion theory prescribes
a formula for finding the minimum description rate
needed to reconstruct a sequence of observations with
limited average distortion. The procedure is to find the
correlation of the source and reconstruction that satisfies
the distortion constraint and results in the lowest mutual
information. By describing a random source at a rate
greater than the mutual information, it is possible to
assure with high probability that the reproduction will
have the desired correlation with the source as measured
by first order statistics.
In the case of the erasure game where Player B knows
the state S, suppose we decide to encode the state for
Player A using a rate-distortion-like code and an erasure
test-channel such that the action sequence results in
S = A roughly 1/4 of the time and S = e roughly
3/4 of the time. The rate required is R > I(S;A) = 1/4
bits per iteration. Unfortunately, this will not result in
a good strategy for Player A. The encoding schemes
that arise in rate-distortion theory are deterministic. The
action sequence A1, ..., An is a deterministic function of
the state sequence S1, ..., Sn. Since Player B observes
the state sequence, he will deduce the actions of Player
A and anticipate them every time. Player A is effectively
not playing a mixed strategy. The resulting payoff will
be 0. The insufficiency of rate-distortion-like codes is a
concern even when Player B does not know the state.
After watching the actions of Player A for roughly
k = R
H(A)n iterations it will be possible to deduce the
entire action sequence. To a clever opponent who does
not know the state, the actions will appear random and
appropriately distributed for the beginning k
n
< R
H(A)−ǫ
portion of the block, for large enough n (related to results
from [6]), and later in the block, when k
n
> R
H(A) + ǫ,
the opponent will be able to decode the sequence with
high probability and anticipate every action. The bottom
line is that rate-distortion-like codes place no emphasis
on producing random actions.
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Fig. 4. Encoding diagram. This illustrates a method of encoding
a state sequence Sn to allow an action sequence An to be random
even to an observer of the state. An auxiliary variable U is chosen
which separates S and A into a Markov chain, and a codebook of
U
n sequences is agreed upon. The state sequence Sn is a random
realization. The encoder observes Sn and randomly chooses among
jointly typical Un sequences from the codebook. After sending the
index of the Un sequence to the decoder, an action sequence is
generated randomly conditioned on Un. If the codebook is populated
densely enough, the actions An will be memoryless and appropriately
correlated with the state sequence Sn. The required density of the
codebook is a topic visited in [6], [7], [8], and [9].
The work in [6] prescribes an encoding scheme for
generating correlated random variables. The minimum
description rate for the state sequence S1, ..., Sn needed
to produce a sequence of actions A1, ..., An with a
distribution that is arbitrary close in total variation to the
desired mixed strategy is Wyner’s common information
C(S;A), defined in [7]. The resulting encoding scheme
for producing this “strong coordination” [8] between the
state S and the action A uses randomized encoding
and randomized decoding. Figure 4 illustrates that the
encoder uses the message to specify the index of a
sequence U1, ..., Un from a predefined codebook, just as
in rate-distortion-like codes, but here the sequences do
not represent reconstruction sequences. After the decoder
identifies the sequence U1, ..., Un he produces the actions
A1, ..., An randomly as the output of a memoryless
channel from U to A. In this way the codebook is
separated from the action sequence A1, ..., An, allowing
more randomness to be injected into the actions.
The common information for a binary erasure channel
can be found in [6]. Thus, the minimum description rate
needed for a helper to describe the state S to Player A in
order to achieve the optimal average payoff in the erasure
game when Player B knows the state is R > C(S;A) =
H(1/4), where H(·) is the binary entropy function.
IV. STATIONARY MIXED STRATEGY NOT NECESSARY
Just as the information structure in a Bayesian game
defines the set of pure strategies for each player, the
description rate of the state that a helper is allowed
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Fig. 5. Degenerate game. This game has two states that are equally
likely. Player B does not have a choice of alternative strategies; there-
fore, from Player A’s point of view this is not really an adversarial
setting. The payoff of the game depends only on the probability with
which A = S. The rate-value tradeoff of this degenerate game can
be cast as a rate-distortion problem. Randomized actions for Player
A are unnecessary.
to use also defines the set of block strategies allowed,
which may have structure and memory from one game
iteration to the next. We know from implications in [6]
that the set of achievable stationary strategies is the set
of conditional distribution pA|S that yield C(S;A) < R.
However, stationary strategies are not the only strategies
worth considering.
A degenerate Bayesian game is represented by the
payoff matrices in Figure 5. In this game Player B has
only one pure strategy. Player A is not really playing
against an opponent but is simply maximizing the aver-
age value of a function of the state S and action A. In
fact, the payoffs in this game are simply the negative
Hamming distortion between S and A; therefore, the
rate-value tradeoff for this game is a canonical example
from rate-distortion theory. A payoff P is achievable at
rate R if R > 1 −H(−P ) for P ≥ −1/2, where H(·)
is the binary entropy function.
In this degenerate Bayesian game the optimal strategy
has structure and predictability. There is no adversary to
compete with, so producing a random sequence of ac-
tions is unnecessary. These degenerate games simplify to
rate-distortion problems and poignantly highlight situa-
tions where fully generating correlated random variables
is not necessary.
V. THE SEARCH FOR A GRACEFUL TRANSITION
The state of a Bayesian game should be encoded by
a helper in such a way that allows a random mixed
strategy to be correlated with the state, even if that
strategy is not entirely unpredictable for the duration
of the communication block. One way to achieve this
is to follow the encoding procedure used to generate
correlated random variables, as in Figure 4, but use a
smaller codebook.
Specifically, a codebook is constructed by first choos-
ing a conditional distribution pU,A|S = pU |SpA|U and
generating 2nR sequences un(i) independently for each
i and i.i.d. according to pU . The encoder chooses ran-
domly (according to the appropriate distribution pre-
scribed in [6]) from all sequences un(i) that are jointly
typical with the state and sends the index I to the
decoder. The decoder then constructs the sequence un(i)
from the index I and synthesizes a memoryless chan-
nel according to pA|U to produce an action sequence
A1, ..., An. If the rate R > I(U ;S,A) then this would
produce a memoryless strategy, meaning that the oppo-
nent could not use observations of the past actions and
states to infer about future actions. However, by letting
R < I(U ;S,A) we also allow for situations where
memoryless strategies are not of the essence.
In order for the encoder to find at least one jointly
typical un(i) sequence in the codebook with high prob-
ability, a rate requirement of R > I(S;U) is necessary.
Beyond that, any excess rate will serve to randomize
the actions for a portion of the encoding block. At first
the actions will appear random and correlated with the
state. After observing a designated fraction of the block,
the opponent will be able to deduce the index of the
message using a channel decoder, revealing the future
of the un(i) sequence, from which the future actions
will be randomly generated. The transition from Player
B knowing nothing about the next action A to the point
where Player B can decode un(i) with high probability
becomes sharper as the block length n grows.
Let α be the transition threshold such that for the first
k iterations where k < (α− ǫ)n the actions are random
according to the mixed strategy pA|S and for the final
k iterations where k > (α + ǫ)n the sequence un(i) is
known with high probability, in the limit as n is large.
Then for the case where Player B does not know the
state sequence, α = R
I(U ;S,A) . For the case where Player
B knows the state sequence, α = R−I(U ;S)
I(U ;A|S) .
Let us designate some notation to represent the score
Player A achieves in a game under different settings.
Let ΠpA|S represent the minimum average payoff Player
A receives by playing a strategy pA|S when Player
B does not know the state S. When Player B does
know the state, we use a superscript to indicate this
and represent the minimum average payoff for Player
A by Π(S)pA|S . Additionally, when an auxiliary random
variable U is involved in constructing the action A such
that pU,A|S = pU |SpA|U and Player B knows U , we
represent the minimum average payoff for Player B as
Π
(U)
pA|U or Π
(S,U)
pA|U , depending on whether or not Player
B also knows the state. Each of these values can be
computed from the payoff matrix Π:
ΠpA|S , minpB
∑
a,b,s
pS(s)pA|S(a|s)pB(b)Π(a, b, s),
Π(S)pA|S , minpB|S
∑
a,b,s
pS(s)pA|S(a|s)pB|S(b|s)Π(a, b, s),
Π(U)pA|U , minpB|U
∑
a,b,s,u
pU (u)pS|U(s|u)pA|U (a|u) . . .
pB|U (b|u)Π(a, b, s),
Π(S,U)pA|U , minpB|S,U
∑
a,b,s,u
pU(u)pS|U (s|u)pA|U (a|u) . . .
pB|S,U(b|s, u)Π(a, b, s).
Theorem 5.1 (Lower bound on rate-value tradeoff):
If Player B does not know the state sequence, an
average payoff P for Player A is achievable with a
state-information description rate of R if
∃(U,A) ∼ pU,A|S = pU |SpA|U such that
ΠpA|S > P,
R > I(U ;S),
R > I(U ;S,A)
P −Π
(U)
pA|U
ΠpA|S −Π
(U)
pA|U
.
If Player B knows the state sequence, an average payoff
P for Player A is achievable with a state-information
description rate of R if
∃(U,A) ∼ pU,A|S = pU |SpA|U such that
Π(S)pA|S > P,
R > I(U ;S) + I(U ;A|S)
(
P −Π
(S,U)
pA|U
Π
(S)
pA|S −Π
(S,U)
pA|U
)+
.
The lower bound of Theorem 5.1 accommodates set-
tings where full randomization is needed, such as optimal
play in the erasure game when Player B knows the state,
and it also accommodates efficient communication for
degenerate games where the payoff does not change
when the opponent learns about the action A. It is
not clear, however, whether or not this gives the whole
tradeoff for sub-optimal play in games where the com-
munication limits do not allow for ideal randomization.
For example, what is the value of the erasure game when
Player B knows the state sequence and R < H(1/4),
where H(·) is the binary entropy function?
If the bound in Theorem 5.1 is not tight, a couple
of ideas come to mind for improvement. One is to use
an encoding method that is not stationary but moves
from one strategy to another as the opponent learns. In
game settings, time-sharing must be analyzed carefully.
The performance depends on whether the time-sharing
is interleaved or not. A related idea is to use a layered
encoding scheme, so that the opponent learns the mes-
sage a little bit at a time. A possible layered approach
follows.
The helper who observes the state can send a mes-
sage in layers to Player A by selecting two auxiliary
random variables U1 and U2 and an action A such that
S − (U1, U2) − A form a Markov chain. A codebook
of un1 sequences of size 2n(I(U1;S)+ǫ) is generated from
the i.i.d. distribution, and for each of these sequences
a codebook of un2 sequences of size 2n(R−I(U1;S)−ǫ) is
generated conditioned on un1 . We let ǫ be small. The
encoder first finds a un1 sequence that is appropriately
correlated with the state sequence Sn and then chooses
randomly from the un2 sequences in the conditional
codebook that are appropriately correlated with both
un1 and Sn. The decoder constructs un1 and un2 from
the message and synthesizes a memoryless channel to
generate the action sequence An from un1 and un2 .
Using this encoding scheme, the block will be divided
into three sections partitioned by α1 and α2, where
the knowledge of Player B transitions sharply at these
thresholds in the limit as n becomes large. For the first
k iterations where k < (α1− ǫ)n the actions are random
according to the mixed strategy pA|S . For the middle k
iterations where (α1+ǫ)n < k < (α2−ǫ)n the opponent
knows U1, which is correlated with A, and for the final k
iterations where k > (α2+ǫ)n the opponent knows both
U1 and U2. In the setting where Player B does not know
the state sequence, α1 = I(U1;S)I(U1;S,A) and α2 =
R−I(U1;S)
I(U2;S,A|U1)
as long as α1 < α2 < 1. In the setting where Player B
knows the state sequence, α1 = 0 and α2 = R−I(U1,U2;S)I(U2;A|U1,S)
as long as α2 < 1.2
We omit the explicit lower bound that is obtained from
this encoding scheme. It is a straightforward derivation
and provides little additional insight. However, if a
layered scheme proves to provide improvement over
Theorem 5.1, then the idea of adding additional layers
with additional auxiliary variables comes to mind. Each
additional variable would introduce a new phase of
performance in the game. This quickly becomes cumber-
some. Perhaps instead there is a smooth way of adjusting
2In the case where Player B does not know the state, if α1 > α2
then this layered encoding scheme does not provide any benefit over
Theorem 5.1. And with either assumption about Player B, if α2 > 1,
the encoding scheme can be modified to increase α1.
the strategy as the game proceeds and the opponent infers
more about the communication.
VI. SUMMARY
We have considered partial state information in a
Bayesian game from an optimization perspective. If a
limited amount of state information is passed by a helper
to one of the players in a two player zero-sum repeated
Bayesian game, how much can it increase the value
of the game? The description of the state can be used
to correlate the actions in the game with the state.
In some settings, mutual information is the description
rate needed to adequately correlate behavior. But in
the adversarial setting of games, a rate-distortion-like
compression of the state information at a rate equal to the
mutual information results in behavior that is predictable
by the opponent. On the other hand, Wyner’s common
information has been shown to be the description rate
needed to fully correlate actions in a completely unpre-
dictable way. However, this can be more than necessary.
We introduce a communication scheme that performs
efficiently (Theorem 5.1) in the two extreme cases,
where memoryless randomization is essential and where
it is irrelevant. Although the communication is based on
i.i.d. codebooks, the performance in the game changes
dramatically mid-way through the communication block
as the opponent infers the compressed message. The non-
stationary performance of a stationary encoding scheme
introduces new challenges in the quest for efficient
compression.
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